



What, When and Who:  
Manager Involvement in Predicting Employee Resistance to Acquisition Integration 
 
 
Abstract. Applying sensemaking research to acquisition integration, we outline 
factors that influence employee resistance to acquisitions. While integration is 
widely viewed as important to acquisition outcomes, there is limited systematic 
study of how employees react to the integration process. Using survey data from 
Chinese acquirers and applying partial least squares structural equation modelling, 
we examine what changes with human and task integration with the speed of 
when changes are made to explore relationships with employee resistance. 
Consistent with a temporal perspective of acquisition processes and sensemaking 
we find slower task integration may mitigate employee resistance to acquisition 
integration. However, employee resistance to the speed that changes are made 
likely varies for who is involved, suggesting different roles for top and middle 
managers. Specifically, middle management involvement with slow human 
integration and top management involvement with fast task integration reduces 






During acquisitions, research recognizes that Human Resource Management (HRM) has a 
facilitating role for successful knowledge transfer associated and an absorptive capacity for target 
firms and employees that improves organizational performance (Katou, Budhwar & Patel, 2014; 
Liu & Meyer, 2018; Zhou, Fey, & Yildiz, 2018). Associated research recognizes that acquisitions 
provide an interesting context to investigate employee reactions (Edwards & Edwards, 2013; 
2015). For example, changes associated with acquisition integration increase the risk of employee 
resistance that represents a primary reason for acquisition failure (Drori, Wrzesniewski & Ellis, 
2011; Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999; Melkonian, Monin & Noorderhaven, 2011).  
Increased recognition that integration is difficult and often harder to implement than 
expected (Colman & Rouzies, 2018; Rouzies, Colman & Angwin, 2018; Vaara, 2003) has led to 
research on acquisition integration and an examination of what influences its outcomes (Gill, 
2012; Graebner, Heimeriks, Huy & Vaara, 2017; Pickering, 2017; Sarala, Vaara, & Junni, 2017; 
Teerikangas, Véry & Pisano, 2011). While some level of integration of an acquired firm is 
necessary (Shrivastava, 1986; Vermeulen, 2005), integration is disruptive to employees of 
combining firms and it contributes to: 1) fear of job loss (Schweiger & Denisi, 1991), 2) 
perceptions of unfair treatment and negative career effects (Fried et al., 1996), 3) anxiety over 
changed social relationships (Astrachan, 1995), and 4) increased uncertainty and stress 
(Cartwright & Cooper, 1993; Marmenout, 2010). Although disruptions to employees from 
acquisition integration can contribute to employee resistance (Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999), a 
better understanding of what influences employee resistance is still needed (Meglio, King & 
Risberg, 2015; Ellis, Weber, Raveh & Tarba, 2012). 
By examining key decisions during acquisition integration that influences employee 
perceptions and acquisition outcomes (e.g., Jemison & Sitkin, 1986; Shi & Prescott, 2011, 2012), 
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we argue that considering what changes with when it changes and who manages integration 
efforts can improve our understanding of acquisition outcomes. Building on insights that 
employee resistance is associated with acquisition failure (e.g. Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999), we 
examine the pace and level of managerial intervention in predicting employee resistance to 
human and task integration. Our aim is to develop and test a framework that predicts employee 
resistance to an acquisition.  
Building on the theoretical foundation of sensemaking and sensegiving (Maitlis, & 
Christianson, 2014; Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010; Weick, 1995), we examine differential roles by 
top and middle managers during acquisition integration. Although top managers are assumed to 
initiate and lead integration, the role of middle managers in implementing change following an 
acquisition remains largely unexplored (Meglio & Risberg, 2010; Meyer, 2006). While top 
management begins integration planning (Cullinan, Le Roux & Weddigen, 2004), middle 
managers confront problems of implementing changes they did not plan and dealing with 
employee fears of those changes (Balogun & Johnson, 2004).  
Addressing these topics offers multiple contributions. First, our study supports acquisition 
research on human and task integration to develop how what changes during acquisition 
integration influences employee resistance (e.g., Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999; Seo & Hill, 2005). 
Second, we contribute to a process view (Jemison & Sitkin, 1986), specifically responding to 
insights that understanding employee responses to an acquisition requires a greater focus on 
integration speed (Stahl et al., 2013), or when changes are made (Birkinshaw, Bresman & 
Hakanson, 2000). Third, we increase clarity about agency in acquisitions by examining who is 
involved in setting and implementing human and task integration. By distinguishing the impact of 
managers at different hierarchical levels on employee resistance, we develop differences in top 
and middle managers sensegiving and provide insights into the role of managers during 
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integration. In so doing, we examine unique primary data using acquirers from an emerging 
economy, more precisely China, complementing a bias in management research towards Western 
economies (cf. Meglio & Risberg, 2011). However, this may also limit generalizability. 
Theory and Hypothesis Development 
Following an acquisition, employees expect change (Risberg, 1997), but managing the 
uncertainty typically associated with substantial organizational change, such as an acquisition, 
requires manager sensemaking and sensegiving (Clark, Gioia, Ketchen, & Thomas, 2010; Gioia 
& Chittipeddi, 1991). Sensemaking involves meaning construction and reconstruction in 
developing frameworks to understand intended changes (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991; Stensaker, 
Falkenberg & Gronhaug, 2008). Meanwhile, sensegiving involves the process of attempting to 
influence the sensemaking and meaning construction of others toward desired changes (Gioia & 
Chittipeddi, 1991; Stensaker et al., 2008). However, most research assumes that managers direct 
change without examining the processes of how change is implemented (Sonenshein, 2010; 
Steigenberger, 2017), or recognizing that managers are also involved in sensemaking (Vaara. 
2003; Monin, Noorderhaven, Vaara & Kroon, 2013). For both integration planning and 
sensegiving, either too little or too much detail is possible (e.g., Eisenhardt, Furr & Bingham, 
2010; Henneberg, Naude & Mouzas, 2010) with the implication that what changes, the speed it 
changes (when), and managerial roles, or who is involved at different levels of an organization 
likely influence employee resistance to change. As a result, the initial relationships in our 
framework rest on research on acquisition integration and associated changes that lead to the 
need for sensemaking, see Figure 1. 





What Changes, or Type of Integration 
Acquisition integration essentially involves organizational change (King, Bauer & Schriber, 
2018), and research on change suggests a consideration of ‘high impact’ elements of change may 
be necessary to transform organizations (Amis, Slack & Hinings, 2004). We combine the element 
of pace (speed) highlighted by Amis and colleagues (2004) with recognized dimensions of 
acquisition integration. Specifically, integration involves human and task integration that are 
distinct, but inter-related concepts that drive acquisition success (Bauer, King & Matzler, 2016; 
Birkinshaw et al., 2000; Bauer, Schriber, Degischer & King, 2018). Human integration addresses 
human resource management (i.e., pay and benefits) and organizational culture (Cording, 
Christmann & King., 2008), and it focuses on creating positive attitudes and a shared identity 
(Meglio et al., 2015; Schweiger, Ivancevich & Power, 1987). For example, Vaara (2003) finds 
that overlooking people issues during integration often proves detrimental. Meanwhile, the task 
integration focuses on operational efficiencies from combining organizational functions to 
improve efficiency and organizational coordination (Bauer et al., 2016; Cording et al., 2008; 
Meglio et al., 2015), and on transferring and sharing resources and capabilities (Birkinshaw et al., 
2000).  
Human Integration. Acquisitions disrupt employees and create uncertainty (Rafferty & 
Restubog, 2010), as employees are confronted by possible job losses, increased workload, and 
changes in reporting relationships (Ullrich & van Dick, 2007). Associated changes in employee 
identity contribute to employee resistance following an acquisition (Cho, Lee & Kim, 2014; 
Ullrich, Wieseke & van Dick, 2005). However, a heightened awareness of human aspects of 
acquisitions can reduce conflict and resistance following an acquisition (Ellis, Weber, Raveh & 
Tarba, 2012; Seo & Hill, 2005) by establishing mutual understanding and trust (Birkinshaw et al., 
2000; Stahl, Larsson, Kremershof & Sitkin, 2011). Trust is important to acquisition success and 
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building it requires sensemaking of intentions (Searle & Ball, 2004). As a result, demonstrating a 
firm’s commitment to employees with human integration (Bauer et al., 2018) can build 
organizational cohesion (Rouzies et al., 2018) and reduce employee resistance. For example, 
human integration may decrease employee career uncertainty and lessen fear of job loss. 
Conversely, overlooking human integration concerns can be detrimental to acquisition integration 
(Vaara, 2003). Therefore, we predict: 
Hypothesis 1a: Human integration decreases employee resistance following an 
acquisition. 
 
Task integration. Task integration creates value from updating employee work processes 
(Colman & Lunnan, 2011). However, coordination between combining firms on work processes 
disrupts prior employee routines (Bauer et al., 2016). As a result, updating work processes 
inevitably lowers task performance and contributes to employee resistance (Bauer et al., 2016; 
Cooke & Huang, 2011). For example, change in developed processes impacts the ability of teams 
to coordinate on interdependent tasks, as efforts become either fragmented or duplicated 
(Summers, Humphrey & Ferris, 2012). As a result, task integration addresses coordination in 
updated processes, as well as discontinuation of prior tasks (Rouzies et al., 2018). Still, 
acquisitions often struggle because employees experience discontinuity in job tasks (Paruchuri, 
Nerkar & Hambrick, 2006; Ullrich et al., 2005), and this may contribute to employee resistance. 
Therefore, we predict: 
Hypothesis 1b: Task integration increases employee resistance following an acquisition.  
 
When it changes, or Duration of Integration 
 
An important decision for both human and task integration involves the speed under which 
changes are made (Bauer, King & Matzler, 2016; Meglio et al., 2017). While managers in general 
prefer greater integration speed to accelerate improvements (e.g., Schlaepfer et al., 2008), 
7 
 
employees might react either positively to reinforce improvements or negatively with resistance 
that unravels initial positive effects of human and task integration. This leads us to anticipate that 
human and task integration duration mediates the influence of human and task integration on 
employee resistance. Additionally, the impact of human and task integration is not free of 
constraints and depends on other contingencies, such as fit (Homburg & Bucerius, 2006), 
decision-making preferences (Uzelac et al., 2016), and institutions (Bauer et al., 2018). 
Therefore, we also argue later that the influence of integration duration is likely moderated by 
whether top management or middle management is responsible for the different dimensions of 
acquisition integration and associated sensegiving. 
Human integration speed. How quickly managers attempt to establish a positive 
environment between combining firms during integration is an important consideration. Fast 
human integration can minimize disruption and prevent employee resistance (Angwin, 2004, 
Bauer et al., 2016). Moving quickly with human integration can also take advantage of initial 
optimism from an acquisition (Buono & Bowdich, 2003), as employees anticipate changes 
following an acquisition (Risberg, 1997). Further, an early focus on collaboration can minimize 
conflicts and employee uncertainty (Jansen, Tempelaar, Van den Bosch & Volberta, 2009; 
Ullrich & can Dick, 2007; Vaara, 2003). As a result, moving quickly with human integration can 
create positive momentum (Gates & Very, 2003), and speed can help to avoid problems during 
what otherwise can be a lengthy integration process (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991). Therefore, 
we predict: 
Hypothesis 2a: Shorter duration of human integration lowers employee resistance 
following an acquisition. 
 
Task integration speed. While a significant source of value generation from acquisitions 
comes from gains in efficiency (Siegel & Simons, 2010) or from implementing superior acquirer 
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processes in a target organization (Andrade, Mitchell & Stafford, 2001; Jovanic & Rousseau, 
2002), task integration interrupts coordination in organizational tasks resulting in coordination 
problems and conflicts (Shrivastava, 1986). There is also evidence that increased integration 
speed comes at the expense of necessary support to employees in adapting to new routines 
(Nemanich & Vera, 2009). The faster the changes in employees’ task environment occur, the less 
likely social interactions between tasks will also be updated (Weick & Roberts, 1993) and this 
disrupts tacit knowledge (Nonaka, 1994). Meanwhile, slower task integration can allow for 
iteration in the use of routines to facilitate task performance (Bauer et al., 2016; Lavie, Stettner & 
Tushman, 2010) and to deepen a common understanding that refines tacit knowledge (Levitt & 
March, 1988; Nonaka, 1994) that is likely associated with employee adoption of new procedures. 
Therefore, we predict: 
Hypothesis 2b: Shorter duration of task integration increases employee resistance 
following an acquisition. 
 
Who Facilitates Change, or Differences in Managerial Roles 
 
Drawing on the resource‐based view, Lamont, King, Maslach, Schwerdtfeger, & Tienari (2018) 
suggest that the success of acquisitive growth rests on the quality and quantity of an acquirer’s 
managerial talent. We anticipate that the impact of human and task integration duration is 
moderated by whether top or middle managers are primarily involved.  
When considering top managers, they often need less time for sensemaking than other 
employees, because they typically initiate acquisitions or they are involved in developing change 
(Lehn & Zhao, 2006; Stensaker et al., 2008). However, top management involvement is also 
needed to initiate changes in combining organizations (Clark, Gioia, Ketchen & Thomas, 2010), 
and top managers are visible at acquisition announcement (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997). For 
example, top managers can communicate the need behind an acquisition and associated changes 
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to reduce employee uncertainty (Giessner, 2011). However, while change can be directed from 
the top, it still requires sensegiving, or employees understanding change and its intent, as well as 
its implications. For example, acquisition integration planning only includes a few people at the 
top of organizations, but integration implementation involves middle managers and employees 
that require more time for sensemaking (Stensaker et al., 2008; Vaara, 2003). 
Middle managers provide a conduit for employees accepting change, but they confront the 
dual challenge of providing sensegiving and implementing changes they did not design and may 
only partially understand themselves (Balogun & Johnson, 2004; Stensaker et al., 2008). Further, 
implementation of planned changes requires a delicate balance, as employee resistance to change 
occurs when they perceive change does either too little or too much (Sonenshein, 2010). The 
need for implementation suggests an increased importance of middle managers during integration 
that is largely overlooked in acquisition research (Meglio & Risberg, 2010). Not considering 
middle managers is an important omission, as research suggests they account for significant 
differences in firm performance (Mollick, 2012). We anticipate moderating and differential 
effects of top and middle managers are most evident in how fast human and task integration 
proceeds. 
Human Integration Speed. For human integration, top manager involvement with 
integration can improve employee retention (Steigenberger, 2017; Zhang et al., 2015). For 
example, top managers can quickly address concerns associated with a lack of information with a 
letter to employees that creates a sense of necessity for change (Giessner, 2011; Schweiger et al., 
1987; Schweiger & Denisi, 1991). Still, top managers often employ ambiguity to maintain 
latitude while outlining common ground without the means to achieve it (Davenport & Leitch, 
2005; Gioia, Nag & Corley, 2012). However, ambiguity drives sensemaking and it can contribute 
to shock and perceptions of injustice (cf. Gioia et al., 2012; Yang, Treadway & Stepina, 2013). 
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When human integration is completed quickly, acquiring firm managers are likely to be 
disproportionally represented in leadership roles (Welch & Welch, 2005). This can drive 
disillusionment and resistance from target firm managers and employees that can have more 
insight in how combined resources can create value (e.g., Chreim, 2015; Chreim & Tafaghod, 
2012; Graebner, 2004). Further, top managers can facilitate faster reaction to problems and 
maintain momentum (Angwin, 2004). These issues confirm observations that the importance of 
top managers to human integration matters (Schweiger et al., 1987). Therefore, we predict: 
Hypothesis 3a: For shorter duration of human integration, greater top management 
involvement reduces employee resistance. 
 
While top managers can direct reorganization, it requires employee sensemaking to 
implement (Crevani, Lindgren & Packendorff, 2010) and this is facilitated by middle managers 
translating goals into initiatives (Stensaker et al., 2008). Middle manager sensegiving is more 
likely for issues involving organizational performance and operational effectiveness (Maitlis & 
Lawrence, 2007) that are generally degraded during integration. For example, middle managers 
often provide sensegiving following structural interventions and promote an understanding of 
change (Balogun & Johnson, 2004; Steigenberger, 2017). As a result, middle managers adapt 
integration based on employee concerns (Gates & Very, 2003). We anticipate middle manager 
sensemaking constructs meaning that enables sensegiving to employees (Sonenshein, 2010). Huy 
(2011) recognizes an important role of middle managers in dealing with employee emotions, and 
we maintain this takes time or it is most evident for longer duration of human integration. 
Therefore, we predict: 
Hypothesis 3b: For longer duration of human integration, greater middle manager 
involvement reduces employee resistance. 
 
Task Integration Speed. Deciding on organizational structure relates to prescribed changes 
made by top management (Hinings & Greenwood, 1988), and for acquisitions identifying 
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planned changes needs to be done early (Gates & Very, 2003). Making the best use of firm 
resources requires avoiding delays on resource deployment decisions (Brueller, Carmeli & Drori, 
2014) that can involve selecting the best, integrating the best of both, or maintaining separate 
processes (e.g., Ettenson & Knowles, 2006). Tasks and procedures separately co-evolve in 
separate organizations (Penrose, 1959), and recognition of coordination problems during 
acquisition integration represent a consistent theme in research (e.g., Graebner et al., 2017; 
Heimeriks et al., 2012; Penrose, 1959; Zorn et al., 2018).  
Task integration decisions are best made by top managers, as ambiguity on structure and 
processes can contribute to political behavior (Vaara, 2003) that is counterproductive for 
acquisition integration and employee acceptance (Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999; Monin et al., 
2013). Timid integration is a greater risk than integrating too quickly, as only a one-month delay 
in realizing expected annual savings could reduce the net present value of an acquisition by one-
fifth (Chanmugam et al., 2005). Therefore, we predict:  
Hypothesis 4a: For shorter duration of task integration, greater top management 
involvement reduces employee resistance. 
 
Following an acquisition, ambiguity from top management can increase political behavior 
(Vaara, 2003). As a result, a lack of clear strategic decisions from top management on task 
integration can contribute to political contests (Clougherty & Duso, 2011) and conflict (Graetz & 
Smith, 2010). A lack of direction contributes to middle managers pursuing self-interest that does 
not align with firm goals (Burgelman, 1994). Political behavior during acquisition integration is 
often counterproductive (Meyer, 2008) in that it contributes to employee uncertainty and 
dissatisfaction (Ferris & Kacmar, 1992; Monin et al., 2013). For example, political behavior and 
associated employee uncertainty contribute to perceptions of procedural injustice (Yang et al., 
2013) that can contribute to employee resistance. Over time, challenges of middle manager 
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involvement are likely compounded if it fills a void on the strategic direction of task integration 
that results in multiple, conflicting efforts from increased political behavior (Clougherty & Duso, 
2011). Clear direction on task integration for middle managers and employees likely mitigates 
this challenge, and we predict: 
Hypothesis 4b: For shorter duration of task integration, greater middle manager 
involvement lowers employee resistance. 
 
Method 
We used a cross-sectional research design using a survey administered after an acquisition 
occurred. Acquisitions represent a global phenomenon, but there is limited research on emerging 
economies (Gubbi et al., 2010) with most research conducted in the U.S. (Meglio & Risberg, 
2011). A gap between practice and research is highly relevant as China ranks only behind the 
U.S. in the number and value of acquisitions with double digit growth in merger and acquisition 
activity since 2000 (Gaur, Malhotra & Zhu, 2013). For example, in 2017, firms in China 
completed over 13,000 deals worth over $720 billion (Bureau Van Dijk, 2018). As a result, we 
focused on China in developing a sample. In 2017, one of the authors contacted alumni of master 
degree programs from five Chinese universities describing the intent to study M&A and asking 
if: 1) their firm completed an acquisition in the last three years, 2) they were familiar with 
circumstances before and after the acquisition, and 3) they would participate in the study for a 
small reward. A total of 145 managers indicated they would participate in the study, but double-
checking that potential respondents were in a company with acquisition activity in the last 3 years 
resulted in sending the Internet survey to 115 managers. This timeframe is consistent with other 
acquisition research designed to ensure recollection of events is still sufficient (Ellis, Reus & 
Lamont, 2009; Krishnan et al., 1997). From our eligible sample of 115 managers, we received 
108 usable responses for a response rate of 93.9 percent. Respondents were primarily middle 
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managers that were in a position to best respond, as they represent the interface between top 
managers and employees (Raes et al., 2011). The use of key informants enables getting 
information from people knowledgeable about issues unavailable from archival data (Ellis, Reus 
& Lamont, 2009).  
Research Variable Measurement 
We relied on existing scales with minor modifications to fit our research interest. We did this for 
two reasons: 1) established scales have already proven reliability and validity, and 2) it makes our 
results comparable to previous studies (Bryman & Bell, 2011). All questionnaire items were 
translated from English into Mandarin and back and by two people to limit translation bias. Prior 
to sending out the survey, we conducted a pretest to identify unclear terms and to avoid complex 
and abstract questions that might trigger biases (Doty & Glick, 1998), with business professionals 
as well as with academics.  
Human Integration. Human integration used three indicators borrowed from Cording et 
al. (2008). Participants were asked to rate the degree of integration on the three indicators ranging 
from 1 = not at all, 4 = partially, and 7 = fully (AVE = 0.820; CR = 0.932).  
Task Integration. Task integration used four items referring to specific functions in a scale 
developed by Zaheer et al. (2013) for an acquisition context. Again, we applied a seven-point 
Likert scale ranging from 1 = not at all to 7 = fully (AVE = 0.748; CR = 0.922).  
Human Integration Speed. Human integration speed used a single item where the three 
integration items were named as examples, and this resulted from pretest suggestions to reduce 
the length of our survey. Integration speed was assessed as duration with a seven-point scale 
ranging from 1 = less than 6 months to 7 = longer than 24 months.  
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Task integration speed: We measured task integration speed with the four items 
developed by Zaheer et al. (2013) using the same scaling for human integration speed (AVE = 
0.860; CR = 0.961). 
Employee resistance. Employee resistance used five indicators developed by Giangreco 
and Peccei (2005). The original measure comes from assessing resistance to change was slightly 
modified to the acquisition context. The questions asked, whether the target firm personal 
strongly opposed changes following the acquisition on a scale from 1 = not at all to 7 = fully 
(AVE = 0.820; CR = 0.958).  
Moderators. Top and middle manager responsibility used a single item asking for the 
responsibility of acquisition implementation and coordination using a seven-point scale. 
Control Variables 
We also added several controls for variables frequently used in M&A research (Hitt et al., 2009). 
Please note, if not explicitly described, control variables are single item measures. Relative size 
might have a serious impact on acquisition integration, as larger relative size causes political 
infighting and conflict (Gomes, Angwin, Weber & Tarba, 2013), increases coordination efforts 
(Cording et al., 2008), and reduces the beneficial effects of shared mental models (Dao et al., 
2017). Acquisition experience provides an indicator for well-developed acquisition routines and it 
can influence acquisition integration (Barkema & Schijven, 2008). Annual sales are an indicator 
for firm size that leads to increased formalization (Blau et al., 1976) impacting acquisition 
behavior. Firm growth influences organizational behavior, as firms apply different coordination 
and control mechanisms in different stages of their lifecycle (e.g. Greiner, 1998). We assessed the 
average growth three years prior and following the acquisition each with a single item. Finally, an 
acquirer´s structure influences decision-making and behavior, and we applied the organizational 
structure scale with five indicators developed by Covin and Slevin (1988) with a seven-point 
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Likert scale. Due to a low loading we had to delete one item (AVE = 0.705; CR = 0.904). To 
control for corporate forgetting, we assessed acquisitions undertaken in the last three years (Ellis, 
Reus & Lamont, 2009). 
Results 
In Table 1, we share the descriptive statistics from our survey for firm annual sales, acquisition 
experience, the type of transaction, and the average industry growth. Our data reflects the 
objective information on Chinese acquirers. Thus, we assume that sampling bias is not a serious 
issue for our data. For example, the overall growth rate of China’s economy in 2017 was 6.9 
percent (Wildau & Hornby, 2018) and this falls within the highest category of surveyed firms 
with 32.4 percent of firms reporting industry growth between 6 to 10 percent.  
--- Insert Table 1 about here --- 
For assessing our hypotheses, we used PLS SEM that is suitable for prediction-oriented 
research, as it maximizes the explained variance of dependent variables (Hair et al., 2012). We 
examine integration related decisions and their effects on employee resistance with the 
contingency of management involvement. Thus, we do not concentrate on an overall model fit 
that is the focus of co-variance based SEM (Barroso, Cepeda & Rodán, 2010). Instead, we focus 
on the variance explained of the dependent variable by our independent variables. Additionally, 
PLS SEM performs well with smaller sample sizes (Hair et al., 2012). For assessing the 
significance of the proposed relationships, we used the bootstrapping approach with 5,000 runs 
with the individual-level sign changes option (Henseler, Ringle & Sinkovics, 2009). For 
calculating the moderators, we first, standardized the variables and second, chose the product 
indicator option using all possible pair combinations of the indicators (Chin, Marcolin & 




Common Method Bias 
Having collected independent and dependent variables at a single point in time from a single 
respondent, common method bias raises concerns for internal validity (Podsakoff et al. 2003; 
2012). In considering potential impacts of common method bias, we took a-priori steps to 
mitigate it and then performed post-hoc analysis to detect its presence. 
A-priori we took multiple measures to mitigate or minimize the potential for common 
method bias. First, while the tendency to agree (Baumgartner & Steenkamp, 2001) and the 
likelihood of non-differentiated answers (Krosnick, 1999) can lead to problems if the task 
exceeds the cognitive abilities of the respondents, we assume that our respondents are well-
educated specialists and able to answer the questions accurately. Second, our respondents are 
managers with limited time resources, but they were still willing to fill out the questionnaire. 
Consistent with informal feedback, we also assume that the respondent interest in the survey 
avoided problems from satisfying and stylistic responses (Krosnick, 1999). Third, as acquisition 
failure is quite common (King et al., 2004), we assume that social desirability is not a serious 
issue for our data (Podsakoff et al., 2012). We also avoided complex and ambiguous questions 
from feedback on a pretest (Doty & Glick, 1998), used latent variable measures (Harrison, 
McLaughlin & Coalter, 1996), and changed the scale direction (e.g. for speed of integration) to 
minimize response patterns. Still, the sources of method variance might differ from measure to 
measure (Spector et al., 2018). 
Post-hoc we followed advice of Podsakoff and colleagues (2003) and used the guidelines 
developed by Liang, Saraf, Hu, and Xue (2007) to introduce a common method factor in our PLS 
model to assess the relationship between the substantive factor and the method factor. The ratio 
between method factor loadings and substantive factor loadings is 1 to 127. As a result, we 




In assessing our model, we followed the two steps recommended by Hulland (1999), involving: 
1) the assessment of our measurement models, and 2) the assessment of the relationships among 
the constructs. In a first step, we assessed our measurement models according to factor loadings 
(that should exceed a value of 0.7), average variance extracted (AVE) with a minimum threshold 
of 0.5, and composite reliability (CR) (that should exceed 0.7). Based on the analysis, we 
conclude that construct reliability and validity is apparent as all values apart from one item of the 
structure scale exceed the required thresholds, see Appendix B. In a second step, we assessed the 
discriminant validity of our variables with indicator cross-loadings (Henseler et al., 2009; 
Hulland, 1999) and on construct level with the Fornell-Larcker criterion (Fornell & Larcker, 
1981). The analyses reveal no serious issues (see Appendices C and D), and we hold that 
discriminant validity is established.  
Hypothesis Testing 
Figure 2 shows our results. Hypothesis 1a predicts that human integration reduces employee 
resistance following an acquisition, and our results suggest the path is significant and negative (ß 
= - 0.306; p = 0.063). For hypothesis 1b, we find statistical support that task integration triggers 
employee resistance (ß = 0.261; p = 0.093). The relationship between human integration 
decisions and duration of human integration is not significant (ß = -.216; p = 0.136), but the 
negative sign indicates that firms try to pursue human integration quickly. Additionally, shorter 
duration of human integration does not influence employee resistance, as suggested in hypothesis 
2a (ß = -.180; p = 0.144). However, we find that greater task integration is associated with faster 
task integration (ß = -0.356; p = 0.024), but slower task integration speed triggers employee 
resistance (ß = 0.301; p = 0.047). This result suggests partial mediation, as the direct effect of 
task integration remains partially significant (p < .10). For assessing partial mediation, we 
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estimate direct, indirect, and total effects simultaneously to mitigate potential biases occurring in 
traditional step-wise approaches (MacKinnon et al., 2002; Nitzl et al., 2016). To avoid the 
necessity of distributional assumptions (Preacher & Hayes, 2004; 2008), we analyzed the bias 
corrected confidence intervals (Zhao et al., 2010) that are more robust than pseudo t-values 
(MacKinnon et al., 2004). We find that 0 is not included in the bias corrected confidence intervals 
of the indirect effect (lower bound = -0.382; upper bound = -0.006), and the results suggest a 
partial mediation. We also find that human integration decisions and task integration speed, as 
well as task integration decisions and human integration speed, are not related to each other 
suggesting that managers consider them distinct.  
--- Insert Figure 2 about here --- 
Figure 3 helps to interpret the results for Hypotheses 3a and 3b. Hypothesis 3a argues that 
greater top management involvement is beneficial in cases of faster human integration, and it is 
partially supported (ß = 0.150; p = 0.095). A graph of the interaction shows low top management 
involvement with shorter duration (faster) human integration is associated with greater employee 
resistance. By comparison, high middle manager involvement for longer duration (slower) human 
integration is associated with significantly lower employee resistance (ß = -0.201; p = 0.045), 
supporting hypothesis 3b. Both results support our premise of differential effects for manager 
involvement for human integration speed. 
--- Insert Figure 3 about here --- 
Figure 4 helps to interpret the results for hypotheses 4a and 4b. While task integration 
speed increases employee resistance (ß = 0.301; p = 0.047), we find that top and middle manager 
involvement have different moderating effects. While the effects of greater top management 
involvement largely do not differ for changes in duration of task integration, low top management 
involvement is associated with greater employee resistance for longer duration (slower) task 
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integration (ß = -.290; p = 0.045). This finding contradicts expectations for hypothesis 4a, as 
employee resistance is largely constrained to cases of longer duration (slower) task integration 
and low top manager involvement. For hypothesis 4b, we find partial support for a moderating 
impact of middle management involvement on the relationship between task integration duration 
and employee resistance. While middle manager involvement reduces employee resistance in 
cases of shorter duration (faster) task integration, middle manager involvement increases 
employee resistance for high duration (slower) task integration (ß = 0.195; p = 0.087). While not 
matching all our expectations, these results do support our premise of differential effects for top 
and middle manager involvement for task integration duration. 
--- -Insert Figure 4 about here --- 
Some of our controls also have significant impacts on our research model. While 
increasing annual sales (ß = 0.178; p = 0.075) and flexible acquirer structures (ß = 0.185; p = 
0.048) slow down task integration, rapid firm growth (ß = -0.179; p = 0.096) and increased 
relative size (acquisition of larger target) lead to faster task integration (ß = -0.147; p = 0.076). 
The latter result suggests faster implementation to reduce redundancy, and the combined 
significance of these controls is consistent with firms experiencing formalization (Blau et al., 
1976) and pursuing task integration quickly to realize synergies at the expense of employee 
resistance.  
Discussion 
Research on acquisitions has long been concerned about a short-sighted focus on functional 
integration without considering its effects on employees (Cartwright & Cooper, 1993), even 
though it is known to contribute to acquisition failure (Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999). The result 
has been an increased focus on integration decisions, or questioning what to integrate. In contrast, 
when or the speed integration decisions are implemented and who leads integration has received 
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surprisingly little attention (Meglio et al., 2015). We develop how considering when integration 
takes place with agency in the integration process (who) provides a better understanding of 
employee resistance to acquisition integration. Our study supports and expands theory on 
sensemaking (Weick, 1995) to outline when human and task integration happens and who leads 
associated efforts matters, or it begins to explain employee resistance to acquisition integration. 
Beyond demonstrating different roles for top and middle management, our findings elaborate 
theory on integration speed or a temporal perspective in acquisitions (Angwin, 2004) and 
sensemaking (Weick, 1995).  
Research Implications 
At a general level, our findings support established research that integration can stir negative 
sentiments and even employee resistance to acquisition integration (e.g. Fried et al., 1996; 
Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999). For instance, we find task integration increases employee 
resistance while the opposite is true for human integration. We also demonstrate increases in 
resistance can be mitigated by considering human integration. This supports prior research 
demonstrating active efforts, such as increasing organizational identification, can mediate 
unwanted effects following acquisitions (Cho et al., 2014; Seo & Hill, 2005).  
Further, attending to what changes and to the sequence of change (when) matters in an 
acquisition (e.g., Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991), as well as who is involved, can enlighten 
theoretical expectations derived from insights in applying sensemaking to acquisition research. 
For instance, Pickering and colleagues (2017) find forceful and fast integration by top managers 
may lead to reduced client focus among employees, and our findings elaborate and provide 
nuance to this insight. For example, top manager involvement reduces employee resistance to task 
integration, especially when conducted slowly. However, low top manager involvement increases 
employee resistance during low duration (faster) human integration. By comparison, high middle 
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manager involvement reduces employee resistance for low duration (faster) task integration but 
increases employee resistance for low duration (faster) human integration. This matches 
expectations that managers are responsible for acquisition integration (e.g. Larsson & Finkelstein, 
1999), but our results demonstrate differential impacts for who is involved and when. Meanwhile, 
our focus on temporal considerations does not reveal a significant relationship between speed of 
human integration and employee resistance. One potential explanation is that task integration 
‘trumps’ efforts on the ‘human’ or soft side of integration (Cartwright & Cooper, 1995) in 
predicting employee resistance. Resistance can go beyond a lack of enthusiasm or indifference 
for the integration, and it is possible early managerial interventions can avoid more serious 
employee resistance.  
Additionally, our results have theoretical implications for sensemaking research. Our 
findings suggest greater middle management involvement with slow human integration and fast 
task integration can reduce employee resistance. While not specifically examined by us, this 
suggests that middle managers play a role in sensegiving during human integration. While our 
results are consistent with sensemaking explaining acquisition outcomes (e.g. Vaara, 2003), we 
also extend current knowledge of sensemaking and acquisition integration. Specifically, our 
findings suggest that sensemaking is not a passive process, or our results support that managers 
influence employee reactions to change (e.g., Monin et al., 2013; Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991; 
Steigenberger, 2017). Further, we underscore the need for managerial sensemaking and 
sensegiving in examining organizational change (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991), such as an 
acquisition (Clark et al., 2010), by outlining how top and middle managers play different roles 
toward human and task integration. Overall, our research suggests that acquisitions are an 





We confirm that acquisitions represent a means for developing economies to gain access to 
resources and compete on a global stage; however, the success of meeting acquisition goals 
requires avoiding active employee resistance. Thus, for top managers that face conflict with a 
target firm and its managers and employees, our results confirm the importance of organizational 
justice and behavior consistent with implicit contracts (Cording et al., 2014). Further, top 
managers need to consider middle managers and enable them to help address employee resistance 
during the acquisition process by involving them in planning longer human integration and giving 
them clear direction in executing task integration quickly. 
While acquisition research has extensively examined potential sources of failure and 
success, only a handful of acquisition studies have paid explicit attention to unraveling the 
underlying microfoundations of acquisition outcomes (e.g., Angwin, Paroutis, & Connell, 2015; 
Friedman, Carmeli, Tishler & Shimizu, 2016). Further, as noted by Brueller, Carmeli & 
Markman (2018), existing knowledge tends to leave processes underlying acquisitions and post-
acquisition integration unexplored. For example, human resource (HR) concerns are often 
overlooked to the detriment of acquisition integration (Meglio et al., 2015; Vaara, 2003). 
Similarly, Bagdadli, Hayton and Perfido (2014), as well as Weber and Tarba (2010), suggest that 
acquirers need appropriate HR practices for post-merger integration. Additionally, Graebner, 
Heimeriks, Huy and Vaara (2017) highlight the need of better understanding of post-acquisition 
integration with research opportunities on temporality, decision-making, and practices.  
Our study probes agency in acquisition integration and presents an opportunity for 
acquisition research to examine separate roles at different managerial layers. For example, 
Teerikangas and colleagues (2011) demonstrate middle managers contribute to acquisition 
performance by reducing value leakage and increasing value added. We clarify this insight and 
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demonstrate that fast task integration managed by middle managers reduces employee resistance, 
while the opposite is true for human integration. We attribute this to political behavior emerging 
during slower task integration (i.e., Clougherty & Duso, 2011). A similar effect does not appear 
with greater top management involvement in task integration, making us conclude involvement 
of top managers is associated with procedural justice (Yang et al., 2013).  
Limitations and Future Research 
While we balance a heavy Western bias in acquisition research with a sample of managers at 
Chinese firms, context may influence our results. For example, observations suggest acquirers in 
developed nations apply a long-term perspective and a more deliberate approach to integration 
(Kumar, 2009). Still, Khan and colleagues (2018) suggest that Chinese expatriate managers tend 
to view local regulations in a target country as an obstacle to efficiency. The Chinese government 
also influences acquisitions with through state ownership (Chen & Young, 2010). While 
government influence likely exists across our sample, we do not control for the level of state 
ownership. Further, the effects might be different for countries with strong labor protection, as 
employees do not need to fear dramatic changes (Bauer et al., 2018; Homburg & Bucerius, 2006). 
The combined implication of limitations associated with our sample is that additional research 
examining identified relationships needs to test the generalizability of our findings to other 
contextual or institutional settings.  
Research also needs to examine relationships between employee resistance and 
acquisition performance. It is likely that avoiding active employee resistance is necessary, but 
active employee support may not be needed for acquisition success, especially if integration is 
not an acquirer’s goal. Improving temporal impacts in acquisitions also requires a better 




Another opportunity is more closely aligning acquisition research with organizational 
change (King et al., 2018). For example, Amis and colleagues (2004) outline a consideration of 
the pace, sequence and linearity of change can help transform organizations. While we examine 
the duration (speed) of human and task integration, this stops short of other relevant 
considerations that are just beginning to be considered by acquisition research. For example, the 
degree of change also needs to be considered with the time to implement it, and the precedence of 
human and task integration (Bauer et al., 2016). Additionally, most acquisition research considers 
an acquisition in isolation, and the pace of acquisitions and other changes in combining 
organizations is just beginning to be considered (Zorn et al., 2018). Further, our research design 
is cross-sectional and our analysis stops short of examining the linearity of change and causation. 
As a result, reciprocal relationships among our study variables is possible (Latack et al., 1995), or 
our findings depend on statistical conclusion validity (Sussman & Robertson, 1986). Each of 
these considerations represent clear opportunities for additional research. In closing, we hope that 
our ideas lead to additional research on manager effects on employee resistance during 
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Table 1: Sample descriptive statistics 
Annual Sales in %   Acquisition Experience in %  
< 25 Million 15.7  none 2.8 
25 M. - 49 M. 7.4  1-2 60.2 
50 M. - 99 M. 1.9  3-4 22.2 
100 M. - 249 M. 5.6  5-6 7.4 
250 M. - 499 M. 18.5  7-8 0.9 
500 M. - 1.000 M. 14.8  > 8 6.5 
> 1.000 Milion 36.1    
     
Transaction Type in %  Industry Growth in % 
Horizontal 45.4  < - 15% 2.8 
Vertical 23.1  -15% - -5% 5.6 
Conglomerate 31.5  -4% - +/-0% 5.6 
   1% - 5% 22.2 
   6% - 10% 32.4 
   11% - 20% 19.4 
   21% - 30% 6.5 
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Appendix A: Common Method Bias Analysis 
Construct Indicator 
Substantive 
Factor R1 R² 
Method 
Factor 
Loading R2 R2² 
Human Integration HI1 0,849 0,721 0,096 0,009 
 HI2 0,868 0,753 0,046 0,002 
 HI3 0,892 0,796 -0,149 0,022 
Functional Integration FI1 0,731 0,534 0,14 0,020 
 FI2 0,971 0,943 -0,18 0,032 
 FI3 0,916 0,839 -0,11 0,012 
 FI4 0,857 0,734 0,043 0,002 
Human Integration Speed HID1 1 1,000 0 0,000 
Functional Integration 
Speed FID1 0,845 0,714 -0,106 0,011 
 FID2 0,98 0,960 0,091 0,008 
 FID3 0,926 0,857 -0,033 0,001 
 FID4 0,96 0,922 0,05 0,003 
Resistance R1 0,895 0,801 -0,06 0,004 
 R2 0,869 0,755 0,048 0,002 
 R3 0,916 0,839 0,021 0,000 
 R4 0,928 0,861 0,03 0,001 
 R5 0,922 0,850 0 0,000 
Top Management TM1 1 1,000 0 0,000 
Middle Management MM1 1 1,000 0 0,000 
Relative Size RS1 1 1,000 0 0,000 
Experience E1 1 1,000 0 0,000 
Structure St1 0,846 0,716 -0,135 0,018 
 St2 0,883 0,780 -0,092 0,008 
 St3 0,819 0,671 0,158 0,025 
 St4 0,873 0,762 0,074 0,005 
Decentralized DD1 1 1,000 0 0,000 
Growth post GP 1 1,000 0 0,000 
Growth prior GPR 1 1,000 0 0,000 
Sum   23,809  0,187 




Appendix B: Psychometric Properties of the Scales 





Please indicate the degree to which the following items or areas were integrated 
(1, "not at all"; 7, "completely").  0.932/0.893 0.82 
 Organizational Structure 0.937   
 Organizational Culture 0.918   
 Personnel Management Practices (Human Resources) 0.859   
Task Integration 
Please indicate the degree to which the following items or areas were integrated 
(1, "not at all"; 7, "completely").  0.922/0.890 0.748 
 Marketing 0.872   
 Research and Development 0.78   
 Operations 0.913   
 Strategic Planning 0.887   
Human Integration Speed 
Please indicate the duration of integration (1, "less than 6 months”; 4, "14 to 17 
months"; 7, "more than 24 months").    
 Human Integration (Organizational Structure, Culture, and HR) 1 n.a. n.a. 
Task Integration Speed 
Please indicate the duration of integration (1, "less than 6 months; 4, "14 to 17 
months"; 7, "more than 24 months").  0.961/0.946 0.86 
 Marketing 0.922   
 Research and Development 0.911   
 Operations 0.951   
 Strategic Planning 0.924   
Resistance Employees of the target firm  0.958/0.945 0.82 
 …were critical about the change 0.915   
 …were critical about the acquirer managers 0.899   
 …supported union activities against the change 0.891   
 …supported actions of colleagues against the change 0.916   
 …complained about the change to superiors 0.908   
Top Management Who was responsible for the execution and coordination of the M&A process?  1 n.a. n.a. 
Middle Management Who was responsible for the execution and coordination of the M&A process?  1 n.a. n.a. 
Annual Sales Please indicate the annual sales after the acquisition  1 n.a. n.a. 
Growth Prior Please indicate the average firm growth in three years prior to the acquisition 1 n.a. n.a. 
Growth Post Please indicate the average firm growth following the acquisition 1 n.a. n.a. 




Please compare the annual sales of the target with the acquirer in the last year 
prior the acquisition 1 n.a. n.a. 
Acquisition Experience How many acquisitions has your firm conducted in the last five years 1 n.a. n.a. 
Organizational Structure The operating management philosophy of the top management is…  0.905/0.877 0.705 
 
Tight formal control of most operations by means of sophisticated control and 
information systems VS. Loose, informal control, heavy dependence on 
informal relations and norm of co-operation for getting work done 0.914   
 
Strong emphasis on always getting personnel to follow the formally laid down 
procedures VS. Strong emphasis in getting things done even if this means 
disregarding formal procedures 0.925   
 
Strong insistence on a uniform managerial style throughout the business unit 
VS. Managers' operating styles allowed to range freely from the very formal to 
the very informal 0.705   
  
Strong emphasis on getting line and staff personnel to adhere closely to formal 
job descriptions VS. Strong tendency to let the requirements of the situation and 






Appendix C: Cross-loadings 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 Annual Sales 1 0.0334 0.0446 0.1820 0.2645 0.0347 0.2223 0.1414 0.2988 0.0697 0.2276 -0.1286 0.0920 0.2246 
2 Human Integration Speed 0.0334 1 0.7016 0.0024 -0.1056 0.0471 -0.0481 -0.0468 -0.1469 0.1289 -0.1333 0.0612 0.0639 0.1906 
3 Functional Integration Speed 1 0.0144 0.6140 0.9216 0.1668 -0.3490 -0.0030 -0.1723 -0.0150 -0.2816 0.1775 -0.2242 0.2188 -0.0577 0.0005 
3 Functional Integration Speed 2 0.0371 0.6976 0.9114 0.1022 -0.2086 0.0558 -0.1473 -0.0814 -0.1706 0.1330 -0.1383 0.1847 0.0709 0.1301 
3 Functional Integration Speed 3 0.0400 0.5984 0.9505 0.1272 -0.3071 0.0351 -0.2296 -0.0665 -0.2273 0.1941 -0.1386 0.2332 -0.0409 0.0481 
3 Functional Integration Speed 4 0.0777 0.7151 0.9244 0.1086 -0.2668 0.0486 -0.1987 -0.0861 -0.2075 0.1731 -0.2138 0.1179 -0.0795 0.1045 
4 Experience 0.1820 0.0024 0.1388 1 -0.0934 -0.0273 0.1530 0.1066 -0.0525 -0.0435 0.0662 0.1020 -0.0277 0.0973 
5 Functional Integration 1 0.1808 -0.1261 -0.3173 -0.0911 0.8725 0.3032 0.1493 0.1901 0.7094 0.0996 0.1236 -0.0588 0.1683 0.3477 
5 Functional Integration 2 0.2847 0.0613 -0.1672 -0.0400 0.7798 0.2055 -0.0164 0.0485 0.5670 0.2763 0.0601 -0.1123 0.1761 0.2262 
5 Functional Integration 3 0.2508 -0.1495 -0.2945 -0.0593 0.9130 0.1993 0.1335 0.1516 0.7151 0.1532 0.1103 -0.0152 0.2267 0.2667 
5 Functional Integration 4 0.2401 -0.0745 -0.2534 -0.1189 0.8874 0.2015 0.0729 0.1379 0.7220 0.1143 0.0774 -0.1282 0.2190 0.2304 
6 Decentralized Decisions 0.0347 0.0471 0.0343 -0.0273 0.2663 1 0.0654 0.0917 0.2746 0.2368 0.1411 0.1181 0.1880 0.0951 
7 Growth Post 0.2223 -0.0481 -0.2039 0.1530 0.1156 0.0654 1 0.3874 0.1462 -0.0567 0.3014 -0.0388 0.2074 0.1217 
8 Growth Prior 0.1414 -0.0468 -0.0644 0.1066 0.1658 0.0917 0.3874 1 0.1205 0.0367 0.0811 -0.0395 0.0731 0.1134 
9 Human Integration 1 0.3173 -0.1638 -0.2501 -0.0453 0.7696 0.2782 0.1151 0.1527 0.9373 0.1539 0.0719 -0.1815 0.1432 0.3354 
9 Human Integration 2 0.2618 -0.1622 -0.2462 -0.0477 0.7318 0.1980 0.1306 0.0825 0.9176 0.0870 0.0616 -0.1462 0.1933 0.3332 
9 Human Integration 3 0.2128 -0.0378 -0.1367 -0.0523 0.6303 0.2866 0.1686 0.0806 0.8594 0.0278 0.1032 -0.1662 0.1499 0.4006 
10 Structure 1 0.0699 0.1953 0.2755 -0.0501 0.0951 0.1983 -0.1243 -0.0424 0.0735 0.9143 -0.1283 0.2522 -0.0156 0.0144 
10 Structure 2 0.0727 0.1050 0.1524 -0.0348 0.1256 0.2077 -0.0092 0.0273 0.0639 0.9248 -0.0710 0.3266 -0.0041 0.0021 
10 Structure 3 0.0310 -0.0615 -0.0328 -0.1158 0.2953 0.2552 -0.0320 0.1424 0.2129 0.7049 -0.1187 0.1649 -0.0851 0.1202 
10 Structure 4 0.0337 0.0366 0.0321 0.0218 0.2212 0.2073 0.0250 0.1536 0.1540 0.7960 -0.0392 0.1896 -0.0552 0.1496 
11 Relative Size 0.2276 -0.1333 -0.1950 0.0662 0.1128 0.1411 0.3014 0.0811 0.0827 -0.1045 1 -0.0343 0.1341 -0.0022 
12 Resistance 1 -0.1144 0.0566 0.2116 0.1186 -0.1006 0.0680 -0.0175 -0.0022 -0.1993 0.2228 -0.0491 0.9147 -0.1457 -0.0826 
12 Resistance 2 -0.1042 0.0538 0.1779 0.1277 -0.1458 0.0769 -0.0198 -0.0251 -0.2089 0.2179 -0.0403 0.8986 -0.2207 -0.1620 
12 Resistance 3 -0.0965 0.0961 0.2406 0.0389 -0.0091 0.1683 -0.0638 -0.0388 -0.0826 0.3420 -0.0529 0.8910 -0.0764 0.0142 
12 Resistance 4 -0.1010 0.0453 0.1926 0.0602 -0.0689 0.0874 -0.0641 -0.0580 -0.1304 0.2950 -0.0312 0.9159 -0.1382 -0.0730 
12 Resistance 5 -0.1641 0.0255 0.1128 0.1143 -0.0491 0.1327 -0.0124 -0.0555 -0.1951 0.2633 0.0170 0.9084 -0.1219 -0.1964 
13 Responsibilities_1 0.0920 0.0639 -0.0349 -0.0277 0.2279 0.1880 0.2074 0.0731 0.1791 -0.0279 0.1341 -0.1548 1 0.2084 
14 Responsibilities_2 0.2246 0.1906 0.0700 0.0973 0.3162 0.0951 0.1217 0.1134 0.3835 0.0484 -0.0022 -0.1110 0.2084 1 
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Appendix D: Fornell-Larcker Criteria 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 Human Integration Speed 1              
2 
Functional Integration 
Speed 0.7016 0.9271             
3 Human Integration -0.1469 -0.2438 0.9053            
4 Middle Managers 0.1906 0.0700 0.3835 1           
5 Resistance 0.0612 0.2061 -0.1807 -0.1110 0.9058          
6 Functional Integration -0.1056 -0.3116 0.7931 0.3162 -0.0822 0.8646         
7 Top Management 0.0639 -0.0349 0.1791 0.2084 -0.1548 0.2279 1        
8 Annual Sales 0.0334 0.0446 0.2988 0.2246 -0.1286 0.2645 0.0920 1       
9 Decentralized Decisions 0.0471 0.0343 0.2746 0.0951 0.1181 0.2663 0.1880 0.0347 1      
10 Experience 0.0024 0.1388 -0.0525 0.0973 0.1020 -0.0934 -0.0277 0.1820 -0.0273 1     
11 Growth Post -0.0481 -0.2039 0.1462 0.1217 -0.0388 0.1156 0.2074 0.2223 0.0654 0.1530 1    
12 Growth Prior -0.0468 -0.0644 0.1205 0.1134 -0.0395 0.1658 0.0731 0.1414 0.0917 0.1066 0.3874 1   
13 Relative Size -0.1333 -0.1950 0.0827 -0.0022 -0.0343 0.1128 0.1341 0.2276 0.1411 0.0662 0.3014 0.0811 1  
14 Structure 0.1289 0.1853 0.1095 0.0484 0.2958 0.1652 -0.0279 0.0697 0.2368 -0.0435 -0.0567 0.0367 -0.1045 0.8399 
 
 
